I wish to give some clues for the understanding of what is sometimes described as my ‘aesthetic’ turn or shift. I am quite aware of the simplistic and retrospective character of the following developments. Nevertheless, I hope they can help not only in understanding my work—which is not the most important issue—but in using it as a tool for what is more relevant: trying to reframe the categories through which we grasp the state of politics and the state of art, and through which we understand their genealogy.

I shall proceed in two parts. In the first part I shall try to show how my present approach to ‘aesthetics’ results from the implications of my former ‘historical’ work. In the second, I shall spell out the common issue that I am addressing now both from the political and the aesthetic point of view.

1.1. My basic concern, throughout my ‘historical’ and ‘political’ research was to point out the aesthetic dimension of the political experience. I mean here ‘aesthetic’ in a sense close to the Kantian idea of ‘a priori forms of sensibility’: it is not a matter of art and taste; it is, first of all, a matter of time and space. But my research does not deal with time and space as forms of presentation of the objects of knowledge. It deals with time and space as forms of configuration of our ‘place’ in society, forms of distribution of the common and the private, and of assignation to everybody of his or her own part.

That concern was already at the heart of my doctoral dissertation, published as La Nuit des prolétaires (The Nights of Labor). In that work, I restaged the birth of the so-called ‘worker’s movement’ as an aesthetic movement: an attempt at reconfiguring the partitions of time and space in which the practice of labour was framed, and that framed at the same time a whole set of relations. That is, relations between workers’ practice—located in a private space and in a definite temporal alternation of labour and rest—and a form of visibility that equated to their public invisibility; relations between their practice and the presupposition of a certain kind of body, of the capacities and incapacities of that body—the first of which being their incapacity to voice their experience as common experience in the universal language of public argumentation.
I showed that at the core of the emancipation of the workers was an aesthetic revolution. And the core of that revolution was the issue of time. The Platonic statement, affirming that the workers had no time to do two things at the same time, had to be taken as a definition of the worker in terms of distribution of the sensible: the worker is he who has no time to do anything but his own work. Consequently the heart of the ‘revolution’ was the partition of time. In order to reframe the space-time of their ‘occupation’, the workers had to invalidate the most common partition of time: the partition according to which workers would work during the day and sleep during the night. It was the conquest of the night for doing something else than sleeping. That basic overturning involved a whole reconfiguration of the partition of experience. It involved a process of dis-identification, another relation to speech, visibility and so on.

In *Disagreement*, I tried to conceptualize that ‘aestheticity’ of politics in general. In *The Nights of Labor*, there was no conceptualization. There was only a poetics at work. That poetics tentatively framed a specific sensorium, a specific kind of space and time in order to make that new experience of speech and visibility perceptible, to take it away from the usual connections between social situations and their so-called expressions or forms of consciousness. In retrospect, I would say that it was an attempt to take social matters away from the representational plot, the representational connection of causes and effects and to recast it as an ‘aesthetic’ plot, a matter of variation of perceptions, intensities and speeds, just as the novelists, from Flaubert to Virginia Woolf, did it for life and love stories.

1.2. This means that it was possible to draw a specific relationship between the ‘aesthetic’ revolution through which ‘my’ workers reframed their self-perception or the perception of their world and a wider ‘aesthetic revolution’: the revolution that overthrew the representational regime of the arts by rejecting, firstly, its hierarchy of high and low subjects and genres, secondly, the Aristotelian superiority of action over life, and thirdly, the traditional scheme of rationality in terms of ends and means, causes and effects.

That aesthetic revolution, which took place in the nineteenth century, did not only change poetic values. It also changed the partition of the spheres of experience. I stressed two main aspects of that connection when I opposed my approach to two prevailing approaches to social matters. These approaches were also two prevailing ways of
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1.2.1. There was first the confrontation with Bourdieu’s analysis of Distinction. In his book Bourdieu clearly staged ‘aesthetics’ as ‘social distinction’ concealing itself under the veil of the Kantian ‘disinterestment’ of the judgement of taste. He set up the whole matter as a matter of disguise. He conceived the modern idea of the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere as the denial of incorporated social judgements, which transformed an economic and social capital into cultural capital. Aesthetic difference thus turned out to be a mere sublimation and concealment of social difference.

I argued that the worker’s experience witnessed to a much more dialectical relationship between the social, the aesthetic and the political. The ‘politicization’ of the worker’s experience went along with the sense of a common ownership of the powers of language as well as of the spectacles of nature or the decorum of the town, and with the capacity of appropriating for themselves the practice of poetic language and the ‘disinterested’ gaze on the visible. More basically, it was in keeping with the idea, spelled out by Kant and Schiller, according to which aesthetic experience is a specific sphere of experience which invalidates the ordinary hierarchies incorporated in everyday sensory experience.

Thus, the Kantian assertion of a specific sensorium invalidating the hierarchy of form and matter or understanding and sensibility, and the Schillerian conceptualization of the aesthetic state, proved to be much closer to the social experience of emancipation than the Bourdieusian analysis in terms of aesthetic illusion. Conversely, the analysis in terms of self-delusion appeared to be in line with the old Platonic commandment that everybody stay in his own place. That is, it appeared to be in keeping with the Platonic reduction of aesthetical matters to ‘ethical matters’, meaning matters of collective and individual ethos.

That confrontation with Bourdieu and more generally with the sociology of culture helped me to grasp the paradoxical link between the ‘separateness’ of aesthetic experience and the framing of a political subjectivization.

1.2.2. A second form of link between the two ‘revolutions’ was at play in my discussion of the writing of history. Historians put into
question the wild appropriation of high language by the common people which, in modern times, confused the historical paradigm opposing the truth of material processes to the discourse of the princes and the orators. On the contrary, I conceived it as the widespread availability of writing which meant the very condition for making history: the possibility for anybody to appropriate for him- or herself another ethos than the ethos suited to their condition. At the heart of social emancipation there was the process of appropriation by the workers of a language which was not their language but the ‘others’ language’, the language of ‘high’ literature.

It was not only a matter of wider ‘diffusion’ of printed matter. At stake was the status of writing as a form of partition of the perceptible. Not coincidentally, Plato had castigated the form of disorder brought about by the circulation of the written letter: in its random circulation, the ‘mute’ letter spoke to anybody. Anybody could appropriate it for him- or herself and break away from the order which sets in good harmony the authority of the voice and the distribution of bodies in society.

In *The Names of History* I tentatively elaborated a concept of literariness — or ‘literarity’ — as the power that tears bodies away from their natural destination. In such a way, the ‘aesthetic revolution of the workers’ seemed to go along with the wider ‘aesthetic revolution’, characterized by the wide diffusion of writing and the dismissal of the old hierarchies between high and low subjects or characters.

But the issue soon appeared to be a little more twisted. The aesthetic revolution was not only — as in Victor Hugo’s well-known poem — the ‘bonnet rouge’ (red cap) put on the old dictionary, meaning the new empowerment of the common people. It had its own ‘equality’ and its own ‘people’. I tackled the issue in *The Names of History*. I showed that literature opposed to the random scattering of words, texts and rhetoric the writing of its own ‘voice of the people’. I found it epitomized in Michelet’s narration of the Festival of the Federation. That narration in fact substituted one voice for another. It substituted for the borrowed rhetoric of village revolutionary orators a voice of the soil, a voice of the motherly, nurturing earth and of the dead generations. In that book, I showed how the scientific method of the historians of ‘mentalities’, which stressed the mute voice of the ‘mute witnesses’ of the life of the masses over the chattering of the courts or the streets, was heir to that so-called ‘romantic’ writing of Michelet. Now two consequences had to be drawn from my analysis.
1.3.1. The first consequence was a ‘methodological’ one. It was in line with the conclusions of my critical analysis of Bourdieu. Social science purported to tell the truth about the illusions of literature and aesthetics. But the procedures by which it contemplated that work of demystification of literature and aesthetics had precisely been framed by literature itself; they were part of the aesthetic revolution of the art of writing. Taking the power of speaking away from the speakers to give it back to mute things, leaving the old theatrical stage of the conflicts of ends and means in order to disclose the hidden depths of the self and of society, reading on the very body of mute objects the ciphered meaning of an age, a history or a society — all that was the invention of literature. Social science, social criticism and the science of the unconscious had to borrow from naïve literature the weapons aimed at disclosing its naivety.

This meant that social science was itself the result of a poetical revolution. Consequently a poetics of knowledge might prove more useful to understand the theoretical procedures and the political implications of social science, than social science to understand the procedures of literatures and the social implications of art. More generally that meant that the ‘aesthetic revolution’ involved much more than a new view of art practices and artworks, that it involved a new idea of thought itself: an idea of the power of thought outside itself, a power of thought in its opposite.

1.3.2. Now this methodological shift helped to grasp the complexity and contradiction of the aesthetic revolution itself. On the one hand it entailed a delegitimation of the old hierarchies going along with the procedures of democratic subjectivization. Even the ‘apoliticism’ of those writers who contrasted the cult of literature with any kind of political or social commitment, was part of the ‘equality’ and the equal availability for everybody of everything that occurs on a written page. Their interpretation of equality as ‘equality of indifference’ was part of the same aesthetic ‘separation’ which, on the other hand, brought about the capacity and the materials for a political re-configuration of the partition of the perceptible.

But, at the same time, the ‘aesthetic way of writing’ entailed its own politics. That politics came in conflict with the random process of literarity. While proletarians appropriated for themselves the leftovers of the outmoded high poetics and rhetoric, it framed a new poetics giving flesh to a ‘voice from below’, an eloquent voice of the mute. It purported to decipher the signs written on faces, walls, clothes,
etc., to travel under the visible stage and disclose the secrets hidden underground. It framed what would afterwards be endorsed by social science and criticism: an hermeneutic of social truth, as opposed to political lies or chatter. It was no coincidence that the exemplary plot of the modern novel was the plot of the child of the people drawn to misery, crime or suicide by the reading of a novel, by the entry into the universe of writing.

It was not a matter of personal opinions or strategies. Literature had its own politics. And that politics was part of the wider politics—or metapolitics—of aesthetics: a metapolitics of the sensory community, aimed at achieving what had been missed by the ‘merely political’ revolution—freedom and equality incorporated in living attitudes, in a new harmony between the distribution of bodies and the distribution of words, between the places, the occupations and the modes of being and speaking. Instead of the political inventions of dissensus, aesthetics promised a non-polemical, consensual framing of the common world. The new idea of thought involved in the aesthetic regime of art—thought disconnected from will, thought present in that which does not think, incorporated in the flesh of mute beings—is part of the invention of that which in *Disagreement* I analysed as modern metapolitics. As I understand it, metapolitics views ‘political’ matters as appearances covering the real mechanisms of social life and the true forms of community; it proposes therefore to shift from the stage of appearances and conflicts about appearance to the ‘true’ stage where the forms of collective life are produced and can be transformed.

Such would be the simplistic and retrospective view of how my so-called aesthetic work unfolds the implications of my historico-political research. In the second part of this discussion, I would like to trace a different line of argument by showing how both in fact tackle, in parallel ways, the same issues.

2.1. The first point would be that I am no more a political philosopher than I am a philosopher of art. Writing on politics as such came rather late in my career, just before writing on aesthetics as such. In both cases that concentration first came about as a result of requests that came from outside. ‘Outside’ means two things. It first means that I answered some requests made by persons who thought that, out of my unidentified field of research and mode of presentation, something could be recycled in the usual terms of political or aesthetic theory. The six chapters of *Disagreement* summarize different presentations
that I made following such requests at the beginning of the 90s. I was working on the 'politics of writing' when a friend asked me to contribute an essay to a special issue of a French journal on the theme of consensus. That contribution was the nucleus of what would be unfolded in Disagreement. Five years later I was asked to contribute an essay to the catalogue of the exhibition Face à l'histoire in the Centre Georges Pompidou, and to give an interview on the history of cinema (which was celebrating its centenary), two contributions on 'art and history' which in turn brought about new requests from art journals or art institutions.

While answering those demands I also felt the analogy of what happened at the same time in the so-called political and artistic fields. What happened was currently described as the closure of a certain history or the closure of a paradigm of historicity: end of social utopias, return to the political or end of history on the side of politics; failure of the modernist paradigm on the side of art. Both ends could be summed up in terms of the 'end of the grand narratives'.

2.2. The most common concern in my interventions on politics or aesthetics was to discuss that issue of 'end', to put into question the paradigm of the historicization of politics and art that underpinned those diagnoses of the 'end'. Once more the issue of 'time' appeared to be at the core of the whole affair. The assumption that the times of emancipatory politics had gone, along with the grand narrative of the 'universal victim', could be seen as the reverse side of the old Platonic argument of the 'lack of time' that allegedly prevented the workers from doing anything else but their job. My discussion of politics was aimed at breaking the alleged solidarity between emancipatory politics and any kind of one-way direction of History or any kind of 'grand narrative'. It was aimed at showing that there is no 'end' of politics, that politics is a precarious surplus activity, still on the verge of its collapse.

Correspondingly, my work on aesthetics was aimed at reframing the temporal categories by means of which modern and contemporary artistic practices are generally grasped. Contemporary art usually undergoes a diagnosis of disidentification. That disidentification may be castigated as the collapse of modernity. It may be favoured as the cheerful manifestation of a postmodern age, putting paid to the austerity of the modernist paradigm and showing the vanity of its categories. But modernism and postmodernism agree on the same form of identification of artistic modernity.
Both agree on the idea that Modernity meant the autonomy of art; that the autonomy of art meant that each art followed its own inner logic, according to the law of its own medium; that this autonomy triumphed when poetry became ‘intransitive’ with Mallarmé, when painting resigned the task of figuration with Kandinsky and Malevitch, and so on. Both agree, in fact, on a very simplistic idea of the modern break with the representational tradition, resting on the idea that representation means resemblance and figuration. All my aesthetic work can be viewed as a systematic attempt to question this prevailing historical paradigm since it prevents us from understanding both the transformations of modern and contemporary art and the link between art and politics.

2.2.1. In *Mallarmé, La Politique de la sirène* (*Mallarmé: The Politics of the Siren*), I questioned the standard image of the intransitive writer.\(^9\) I stressed that the alleged ‘loneliness’ of writing is, on the contrary, the search for a new paradigm of writing, linking poetry to dance, pantomime and music as well as to typography and design. I underlined that this search for a new writing was part of a politics which was heir to one of the most common concerns of the nineteenth century, inventing the forms of a new ‘religion’ that could be substituted for the decaying religions, and giving to the young democracy the sacrament of a community both ideal and sensory.

In *La Parole muette* (*Silent Speech*), I generalized this analysis by showing how the idea of pure literature and the idea of literature as the expression of a determined social life are two sides of the same coin.\(^10\) I also questioned the modernist identification between representation and realism by showing that the so-called ‘realistic’ novel was not the acme of ‘representational art’ but the first break with it. By rejecting the representational hierarchy between high and low subjects, as well as the representational privilege of action over description and its forms of connection between the visible and the sayable, the realistic novel framed the forms of visibility that would make ‘abstract art’ visible.

2.2.2. My recent essay on ‘the aesthetic revolution and its outcomes’ tentatively goes back to the very heart of the affair: the so-called autonomy of art that would have been the paradigm of modern art.\(^11\) I tried to show, first, that the autonomy of the aesthetic experience is not the autonomy of art; second, that autonomy itself is still the other side of a heteronomy. From the very beginning, the autonomy
of aesthetic experience was taken as the principle of a new form of collective life, precisely because it was a place where the usual hierarchies which framed everyday life were withdrawn. And the break with mimesis that this entailed also meant that there was no longer any principle of distinction between what belonged to art and what belonged to everyday life. Any profane object could get into the realm of artistic experience. Correspondingly, any artistic production could become part of the framing of a new collective life.

So the ‘modernist’ separation of the artistic sphere appears as a one-sided interpretation of the solidarity of autonomy and heteronomy that is constitutive of the aesthetic regime of art as such and of its ‘politics’. This means that the ‘postmodern’ paradigm is also a one-sided interpretation. The blurring of the borders between high and low art—and ultimately between art and non-art—is not the exclusive character of our present. It does not mean the end of ‘modernity’. On the contrary, it is in line with a process of border-crossing that went along with the whole development of the aesthetic regime of art.

Thus I can say that I tackled the same issue both in ‘politics’ and in ‘aesthetics’ by trying to construct a paradigm of ‘historicity’ equally opposed to the symmetrical one-way narratives of progress or decadence. This paradigm takes into account the inner tension of a regime of art and of thinking and the multiplicity of its lines of temporality. I opposed that contradiction and that multi-temporality to the one-sidedness of the category of modernity.

I should spell out what is at stake in that critique of the notion of modernity, since it underpins my whole research. ‘Modernity’ presupposed a simple link between a historical process of political emancipation and a historical process of the autonomization of artistic practices. In so doing, it concealed the contradictory nature of the aesthetic regime of art and of its politics. When the contradiction became too obvious, it could only be interpreted in terms of a ‘collapse’ of modernity. On the one hand, I would say that this ‘collapse’ was only the collapse of the paradigm. But, on the other hand, that ‘collapse’ itself is a form of radicalization and reversion of the ‘politics of aesthetics’. And this reversion itself has political effects.

2.3. Lyotard’s theory of the sublime has been the main target of my discussion not only because of its importance in the French context but also because it is the most telling example of the reversion
of the modernist paradigm and of the political implications of that reversion. The starting point of his aesthetic of the sublime is in line with the ‘hard’ version of Modernism, the Adornian version which links the political potentials of the artwork to its radical separation from social life and to its inner contradictions. For Lyotard, as for Adorno, the avant-garde must indefinitely draw the line severing modern art from commodity culture. But Lyotard pushes this ‘task’ to its point of reversion. In Adorno’s construction, the external separation and the inner contradictions of the artwork still kept the Schillerian promise of emancipation, the promise of an unalienated life. In Lyotard’s version, they have to witness to just the contrary: the drawing of the dividing line testifies to an immemorial dependency of human thought on the power of the Other, that makes any promise of emancipation a deception.

This ‘politics of aesthetics’ comes to the point where the function of art is to testify to a disaster. It has to testify to the original ‘disaster’ of the soul, to the immemorial dependency of the human mind on the immemorial law of the Other inside it. Then it has to testify to the disaster that results from forgetting that disaster: the disaster of the promise of emancipation, a promise of human mastery that can only be completed as either the plain barbarity of Nazi or Soviet totalitarianism or as the soft totalitarianism of commodity culture. Art thus becomes, in the strictest sense, the mourning of politics. This status of art goes along with the substitution of repentance and memory for any will to political transformation.

Focusing on this reversal of the modernist paradigm in art does not mean shifting from politics to aesthetics. What is at stake in the discussion of art and aesthetics today is the same process that happened in the field of politics, in which the declaration of the end of the social utopias and of the ‘return’ to pure politics meant, in fact, the collapse of political practice in the ‘consensual’ management of economic and social interests—a consensual management which soon appeared to be haunted by its contrary: the plain ‘archaic’ violence of the new forms of fundamentalism, racism and xenophobia. There is no pure politics, just as there is no pure art or aesthetics. The claim for that purity ultimately boils down to the contrary: the confusion of both art and politics in ethical indistinctness.

A few words are needed in order to spell out this ‘ethical’ issue. We hear today many claims for a ‘return’ of ethics or to ethics. In my view, this return to ethics does not sound better than the former ‘return to politics’. Ethics is often viewed as the normative point of
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view from which the values and practices of the other spheres (art, politics and so on) would be judged. I think that this is not at all what we are facing today. What we are facing is much more the confusion of political and aesthetical distinctions in the same indistinct point of view. This is what ethics means. The law of the *ethos* is not the power of the law or of the universal, but the confusion of the law and the fact. In the aesthetics of the sublime, the historical task of the avant-garde is to inscribe the strike of the *aistheton*, it is to obey a law which is the empirical power of the Unconscious or equally the law of Moses. In a less sophisticated way, it is the same equivalence of law and fact which reigns when the issues of American security are confused with the infinite justice enforced by the forces of Good against the forces of Evil—a fight of Good against Evil which in turn is boiled down to the mere factuality of a ‘clash of civilizations’.

What is at stake in Aesthetics and in Politics today is the same process of reversal. The former radicality of political emancipation has been overturned into the thinking of a radical Evil. In the same way, the radicality of artistic Modernism is overturned into a thinking of art which dedicates it to the testimony of the disaster and to the inscription of the Unrepresentable. In both cases, it is the same theology of Time which is overturned, namely the vision of the historical event which breaks through History, separating a time before and a time after. For a long time, that event had been the forthcoming revolution. In the ethical turn, that orientation of times was reversed. History is no more cut by the promise of a revolution ahead of us; it is cut by the event of Extermination that lies behind us, an event which stands for the endless disaster, debarring any process of emancipation.

Time as a form of distribution of the possible and of the impossible: the investigation of this ‘aesthetic’ topic has been at the core of my whole research, from my emphasis on the ‘night’ of the proletarians—meaning their breakaway from a distribution of time in which you cannot do ‘two things at the same time’—up to my polemics against the modernist paradigm in art, which also supposes that an essence of the ‘epoch’ defines what you can or cannot do in art. Substituting a topography of the re-distribution of the possible and a multiplicity of lines of temporality for the order of time prescribing the impossible has been a red thread in the process of my research. I never switched from politics to aesthetics. I always tried to investigate the distribution of the sensible which allows us
to identify something that we call politics and something that we call aesthetics.

JACQUES RANCIÈRE

NOTES

This essay was originally written in English. The following notes have been provided by the editor.


7 The reference is to Jules Michelet’s *History of the French Revolution*. This is discussed in the fourth chapter of *The Names of History*.


